An essay. It’s on intentionality, which is basically any type of causal relation (either a statement or an action) that has a “cause and effect” kind of thing going on. Intentional mental states can include thirst, a desire for something specific, a thought that prompts an action, or a simple prepositional thought. I think that’s all the premises you need; most of it is explained in the essay. I’m arguing against Searle’s position again. ‘Cause I want to.

In his chapter on intentionality, Searle puts forth two differing arguments relating to how the contents of intentional states are determined and what properties of these intentional states constitute their having the contents they do. Out of the two arguments he puts forth—externalism and internalism—he argues for internalism, stating that intentional contents result solely from what is inside our heads.

The idea of internalism basically states that what features constitute intentional states exist entirely in our minds, or, as Searle puts it, “entirely between our ears.” This is in contrast to externalism, which says that intentional content is constituted at least in part by the external world—that is, that it is caused by relations between the mind and the external world. Searle argues his point by emphasizing the idea of conditions, or, more specifically, conditions of satisfaction. Conditions of satisfaction are conditions that allow for mind-world “fit”—that is, in the case of desires, conditions of satisfaction are satisfied when the world (reality) fits the content of the intentional state, and in the case of beliefs or convictions (for example), conditions are satisfied when the intentional state fits reality.

Searle asserts that these conditions are entirely represented in the mind and are entirely internal to it. He uses the example of water to demonstrate this. Something is defined as “water,” he says, if it matches the conditions of satisfaction for water that are set up in a person’s mind. In other words, if the external thing in question matches the “checklist” of traits that characterize the condition of “water” for a person, the thing is then deemed to be water. Here is where Searle draws the line between the internal and external influence: it is up to the external world whether or not an object fits these criteria, but it is up to the mind what the criteria are.

By the end, Searle has basically asserted that the features that enable intentional states to arise are constituted by conditions of satisfaction, the properties of which are set up entirely by the mind itself and are internal to it. In other words, he has stated that (P1) all non-null intentional states have conditions of satisfaction that allow for a mind-world “fit” and that (P2) these conditions of satisfaction are all internal to the mind. Therefore, (C) internalism, the argument that the features that constitute intentional states exist entirely in our minds, is valid.

I believe that it is possible to refute Searle’s second premise, that all conditions of satisfaction are internal to the mind, but in order to do so it is important to break away from an argument based on language or social interaction. I think a stronger argument against internalism can arise from arguing from meaning stemming from the intentional state itself. My argument will keep the same first premise, that (P1) all non-null intentional states have conditions of satisfaction that allow for a mind-world “fit,” but also assert that (P2) some intentional states’ conditions exist independently of the mind’s internal “checklist” and are instead determined by external factors, and therefore conclude that (C) internalism is not a valid argument for how the contents of intentional states are determined.

The best way to demonstrate this is with a primitive desire, like thirst. The intentional state of thirst has a very specific set of conditions of satisfaction, and the things that satisfy these conditions are things that the mind on its own cannot specify. That is, the mind cannot set the conditions for what satisfy thirst on anything that can be solely internally constructed. There is a very set list of things in the world that satisfy the desire of thirst (water, soda, juice, etc.), and the mind cannot create any other things or traits that satisfy thirst.

If we step away from using language as what assigns meaning to things, we can see that a better way to assign meaning to intentional states—and to argue that there is an external factor in at least some intentional states’ contents—is to rely on the intentional states t..hemselves and what actually satisfy their conditions of satisfaction. Looking at the intentional state of thirst in this way doesn’t rely on a social or language-based interpretation of the desire. The desire is the same regardless of what it is called, and the conditions of satisfaction are not something the mind can, on its own, determine.

The mind cannot assign, for example, the condition “sunlight satisfies thirst”—it has no control over what specific externally-existing objects or states satisfy the desire of thirst. The things that satisfy thirst do not do so because they conform to our internal list of conditions of satisfaction—they do so because they are the only things that satisfy the desire. We can say whatever we want in regards to what satisfies thirst—the basic biological fact is that only certain things actually do satisfy thirst. This is the external influence. The mind, on its own, cannot “set” these conditions of satisfaction; the things that satisfy thirst are the only things that satisfy the desire, and they exist independently of and are not dependent on the mind’s internal “checklist.”